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Opening Stages of the Russo-German Campaign 
(June-December 1941) 
Russel H. S. Stolfi 
Naval Postgraduate School 
In the Soviet Union in 1941, a complex, ill-understood play of events 
projected the German field armies in the east close to Moscow in the 
late autumn of the year, but ended with their ultimate defeat. The 
reigning Soviet interpretation of the campaign remains the one in 
which the natural strengths of the Russian motherland and the inspired 
leadership of the Communists predetermined a Soviet Russian triumph 
over the invading Germans. Western historians and writers also gener-
ally agree that Hitler subjected himself and the Germans to inevitable 
defeat by the invasion of the Soviet Union. However, critical reapprais-
al of the opening stages of the Russo-German campaign fails to sup-
port the present Soviet and western views of the war, showing rather 
that the German successes of the first four weeks virtually assured the 
seizure of Moscow-the rail, road, political, psychological, and demo-
graphic plexus of the USSR-in the late summer of 1941. 
After the immensely successful opening stages of the campaign, the 
military dilettante Adolf Hitler sent the German armies into a series of 
gyrations and halts which cast the final battle for Moscow into the au-
tumn of 1941. The magnitude of the initial German successes and the 
extraordinary procrastination of Hitler combine to support a view that 
chance, in the form of Hitler's personality, rather than the predeter-
mined strengths of the Soviet Union, operated to effect Soviet survival 
in the summer of 1941. The Germans retained enough strength even 
later in the year to defeat the Soviet armies defending Moscow and 
seize the capital city and communications center of the Soviet Union, 
but only if the early winter weather remained mild enough not to inter-
fere with offensive movement. Given the closely-run circumstances of 
the final battles before Moscow in October-December 1941, the issue of 
victory or defeat within the lingering framework of Barbarossa still 
hung on historical chance, specifically on the characteristics of the 
onset of the winter of 1941-1942. 
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In July 1940, Adolf Hitler issued his first instructions for an attack 
against the Soviet Union. 1 The German Armed Forces (die Wehrmacht) 
had defeated and partly occupied France and neutralized Britain by 
that time, and Hitler, who proved unwilling to risk failure in an inva-
sion of Britain, had decided instead to deal with his powerful diplomat-
ic partner in the east. The Soviet government had been bold and ag-
gressive in its drive into eastern Europe toward the Baltic and had 
become an immediate threat to Rumania after June 28, 1940, especially 
as concerns the oil resources of that state. The strategic question of 
Germany fighting a war on two fronts was solved in 1941 by the neu-
1 The grandeur and scope of the war in the east supports a large body of 
documents, books, articles, reports, etc. The most complete body of original 
documents is that contained in U. S. National Archives, Guides to German Rec-
ords Microfilmed at Alexandria, Virginia, a catalogue of several thousand feet 
of shelf space of documents formerly held by the U. S. Government in ware-
houses at Alexandria, Virginia, but presently returned to the Federal German 
government. The U. S. Army carried out a broad study of the European war 
and the documents collected; those commissioned to be written can be found in 
U. S. Army European Command, Guide to Foreign Military Studies, 1945-54, 
Catalogue and Index (Headquarters, U. S. Army Europe, 1954). The catalogue 
contains numerous valuable unpublished manuscripts on the subject of the 
Russo-German campaign. The most impressive German historical works on the 
campaign include especially Klaus Reinhardt, Die Wende vor Moskau (Stuttgart, 
1972) and A. Philippi and F. Heim, Der Feldzug gegen Sowjetrussland 
1941-1945 (Stuttgart, 1962). The finest German first-hand accounts of the war 
run the gamut from Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Chicago, 1958) and 
Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York, 1954) through the extraordinary 
collection of first-hand accounts in Paul Carell, Hitler Moves East (New York, 
1964) and his subsequent two volumes on the later years in the war. Important 
works of general scholarship available in English include the early volume of 
George E. Blau, The German Campaign in Russia-Planning and Operations 
(1940-1942) (Washington, D.C., 1955), which is based on German documents 
and conversations with German armed forces personnel (made available by the 
U. S. Army in the period 1945-1954), and the effective later accounts in Alan 
Clark, Barbarossa (New York, 1965) and Albert Seaton, The Russo-German 
War, 1941-45 (New York, 1970). German division and higher-level histories 
exist in growing numbers and uniformly high quality including army works like 
Wilhelm Meyer-Detring, Die 137. lnfanteriedivision im Mittelabschnitt der Ost-
front (Petzenkirchen, Austria, 1962) and the detailed material on the Waffen SS 
in Otto Weidinger, Division "Das Reich," Der Weg der 2. SS-Panzer-Division 
"Das Reich," Die Geschichte der Sturmdivision der Waffen SS, Drei Bande (Os-
nabruch, 1967, 1969, 1978). Journals which have published valuable articles on 
the Russo-German campaign include especially Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitge-
schichte, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, and the French language Revue de 
l'histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale. Concerning the planning for Opera-
tion Barbarossa from the viewpoint of OKH, see Generaloberst Franz Halder, 
Kriegstagebuch, vol. 2 (1.7.1940-21.6.1941) ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Stuttgart, 
1963). 
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tralization of British influence on the continent, and the essence of the 
matter was that only one major land front would exist during that 
year. 2 Hitler, who had a flair for grand strategy and a sure instinct for 
tactical openings, probably realized that the defeat of Britain would 
not be a decisive event. 3 The United States and the British dominions 
would remain potential enemies of great strength, with the Soviet 
Union, the state whose destruction would assure the achievement of the 
National Socialist Weltanschauung, continuing to be the primary target 
for German expansion. The risks involved in the invasion of Britain 
(including the trauma of possible defeat) would also have had adverse 
internal effects in Germany and detrimentally affected a final reckoning 
with the Soviet Union.4 The delay in the final reckoning with the So-
viet Union, which was inherent in Operation Sea Lion, would have ad-
2 The Allies evacuated on June 8, 1940, the last of the 24,500 troops engaged 
in the siege of Narvik in northern Norway. In combination with the evacuation 
at Dunkirk, which was completed by June, 3, 1940, and the collapse of France 
signalled by the armistice of June 17, the Allied flight from Norway left the 
Germans with no active land fronts on the European continent. German troops 
were not committed to North Africa until February 1941, and then only in 
small numbers for the entire year. For the most authoritative account of the 
Norwegian operations based on German sources and available in English, see 
Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945 (Wash-
ington D. C.: Department of the Army, 1959), pp. 1-112. See the recent esti-
mate of the western Allied situation in Europe in 1941 in David Downing, The 
Devil's Virtuosos: The German Generals at War 1940-5 (New York, 1977), p. 53, 
in which the author notes that "the spectre of a two-front war on land had 
been, for an indefinite period, removed" (italics in original). See also Clark, 
Barbarossa, pp. 26-27. 
3 Generalfeldmarschall Eric von Manstein and Generaloberst Heinz Guderian 
held both command and staff positions in the German army which brought 
them into close contact with Adolf Hitler at several of the most crucial junc-
tures of the Second World War in Europe, e.g., Case Yellow planning and exe-
cution, Sea Lion planning, deflection of Barbarossa southward, Stalingrad, 
Kharkov (March 1943), Citadel, and the great defensive battles of 1944 in the 
east. Both officers emphasize that Hitler had substantial military capabilities, 
albeit counterbalanced by his tendency to panic at local crises and to meddle in 
details. See Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 92, 109-111, 117-119 for Hitler's 
strengths and, Manstein, Lost Victories, pp. 121, 125, 274-5, 282-3. See also the 
estimate of Hitler's capabilities with relation to the acceptance of the Manstein 
variant of Fall Gelb for the attack against France in Telford Taylor, The March 
of Conquest, The German Victories in Western Europe 1940 (New York, 1958), 
pp. 166, 168, 171. 
4 See Peter Fleming, Operation Sea Lion (New York, 1957), pp. 144-5, 
229-41, 266-286, and Manstein, Lost Victories, pp. 164-5, for basic considera-
tions in an amphibious attack on Britain in 1940. See also the first-hand ac-
count in Walter Garlitz, Paulus and Stalingrad (New York, 1963), pp. 87-96, 
and the German naval analysis in Anthony Martienssen, Hitler and his Admi-
rals (New York, 1949), pp. 63-91. 
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versely affected the balance of ground strengths between the German 
and Soviet armies. Soviet armaments production was formidable at this 
time, probably exceeding German production of ground weapons by a 
significant margin. 5 In tanks, the German army's most important weap-
on for continental warfare, there was little doubt that an extra year's 
production of the revolutionary Soviet T-34 tank might have given the 
Soviets an insuperable advantage in ground combat. 6 
The High Command of the army, Oberkommando des Heeres (OKI/), 
conducted War Game Barbarossa between November 29 and December 
14, 1940, and included the basic assumption that an effective campaign 
against the USSR would have to be launched across the entire front 
extending from the Baltic to the Black Seas. 7 The obstacle of the Prip-
yat Marshes, the largest permanent marshland in the world, 8 would di-
5 Burton Klein, Germany's Economic Preparations for War (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1959), pp. 181-94, 208-210. The author was one of the directors of the 
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, which was a 208-volume report giving detailed 
insight into the German (and Japanese) war production efforts during the Sec-
ond World War. Klein, in his more general Harvard work, reveals the extraor-
dinary weakness of German armaments production in 1940-1941. British pro-
duction alone of "armored vehicles" was greater than German in both years. 
Soviet production of tanks was also considerably greater than German during 
the same years and the Soviet tank force existing in 1941 proved to be approx-
imately seven times larger than the German force employed in the attack. The 
Germans attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 with approximately 3200 
tanks; the Soviets had approximately 24,000 tanks available for the defense of 
the state. See U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
Diplomatic Papers, 1941, vol. i, p. 807, for Joseph Stalin's account to Harry 
Hopkins of the numbers of Soviet tanks. 
6 Interviews in summer 1966, spring 1967, and spring 1972 with Walter J. 
Spielberger, presently residing in Munich, Germany, and holder of probably 
the largest private collection of data on German tanks and automotive vohi-
cles of the Second World War. Spielberger, in the winter of 1941-42, was a 
young engineer on the German technical team which conducted in east Prussia 
the first detailed examination of a Soviet T-34 (variation A) tank. The armor, 
main cannon, engine, and certain details of the track and suspension system 
were superior to those on any German tank in existence in January 1942. See 
also Rudolf Steiger, Panzertaktik im Spiegel Deutscher Kriegstagebucher 
1939-1941 (Freiburg, 1973), an impressively documented work, where the thesis 
is advanced that the T-34 tank can perhaps be considered the "Kriegsentschei-
dende" weapon, or decisive weapon in the war in the east, responsible for sav-
ing the Soviets in the autumn of 1941, and swinging the entire war in their 
favor. 
7 See Gorlitz, Paulus and Stalingrad, pp. 98-120, which is based largely on a 
Paulus memorandum of August 13, 1946, and gives exceptional insight into 
OKH theoretical planning and the style of the German general staff in ap-
proaching the problem of a successful invasion of the Soviet Union. 
8 George W. Hoffmann, ed. A Geography of Europe Including Asiatic USSR, 
Second Edition (New York, 1961), p. 125. 
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vide the front into two parts, thus resulting in the isolation of the 
northern and southern wings of the advance. In the south, the factor of 
isolation increased the importance of the complete neutralization of the 
various Balkan states. The relatively weak southern wing would be sub-
ject to defeat and the Germans had to assure that the Balkan states 
remained friendly, neutralized, or occupied. Another major concern of 
the OKH was the paucity of communications in southeastern Europe 
relative to the marshalling of an attack into the Ukraine. The isolated 
southern wing of the German advance was also subdivided in turn by 
the barrier of the Carpathian Mountains. Several brute factors of geog-
raphy conspired therefore to limit the strength of the German southern 
wing and the same factors necessitated control of the Balkans prior to 
an attack. 
In the actual event, the opening of Operation Barbarossa was de-
layed beyond the original date of May 15, 1941 for several weeks. Two 
factors contributed to the delay: first, severe winter and spring weather 
conditions which conspired to damage the thinly-developed road net-
work in the east, thereby inhibiting the cross-country movement of 
tracked vehicles; and secondly, the political coup of March 26-28, 1941 
in Yugoslavia, which brought to power an anti-German government. 
Historians and writers have placed much emphasis on this delay in the 
German attack, with the consensus that the Balkan campaign was a 
critical factor in the collapse of the German thrust against Moscow in 
the first week of December 1941, in the teeth of the Russian winter. 
Virtually every book, article, and report taking the opening of the Rus-
sian campaign as its major theme notes the Balkan war, relates it to a 
delay in the opening of Barbarossa, and often proceeds to link it with 
the collapse of a German offensive later in the campaign in December, 
close to Moscow. The subtle but important point, which is made in on-
ly a few of the more perceptive or knowledgeable German works and 
with startling candor in several Soviet works, is that the great offensive 
of June 22-July 16, 1941 had achieved all of the necessary precondi-
tions for German victory over the Soviet Union. The question of im-
portance then is not a delay in the opening of the campaign in June 
but the results achieved by July. 
The July results, which can be equated with the preconditions for 
German victory, include deep penetrations and successful encirclements 
with massive casualties and damage inflicted on the defending Soviet 
forces. The Germans had achieved their first operational objectives-
the seizure of advanced terrain for the final advance to Leningrad 
and/or Moscow, the destruction of the Soviet armies on the frontiers 
north of the Pripyat Marshes, and a deep drive into the Ukraine, with 
the concomitant pinning down of Soviet armies in the south. The four 
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German Panzer groups moving far in advance of the infantry armies 
had fractured the Soviet defenses into three loosely-connected army 
groups incapable of coordinated operations. Very little remained to 
the Soviet high command for survival. The constituted operational ar-
mies of June 22, 1941 had been beaten, with nothing remaining to the 
Soviets but strong reserves of manpower and the potential for further 
ruthless expenditure of forces. But the pace of the German advance 
had been within a framework of operational agility which the Soviet 
command and staff were incapable of matching. The Soviets had not 
the time, space, weather, nor the military expertise to survive on July 
16, 1941. Only the most desperate German error at the highest strategi-
cal level could save the Soviet Union. 
With one notable exception, all of the important actors within OKW, 
OKH, and Army Group Center favored continuation of the German 
offensive with the objective to seize Moscow. The July-August 1941 
consensus among actors as disparate as Jodi and Warlimont at OKW, 
Brauchitsch and Halder at OKH, and von Bock, Guderian, and Hoth 
at Army Group Center constitutes a powerful case in favor of the real-
ism of Moscow as an attainable objective in the summer of 1941. Ques-
tions arise, nevertheless, on issues of logistics, morale, space, time, etc. 
The Germans had achieved astounding gains by mid-July 1941, but did 
they have the logistics system and the morale required to continue the 
attack? 
Virtually all indicators support a view that the Germans were not 
restricted by logistics factors in the scope or direction of their opera-
tions from June to September 1941. At the highest level of considera-
tion, the German economy had produced and stockpiled adequate 
quantities of food, ammunition, and fuel to support continued offensive 
operations across the entire front in the Soviet Union. The key logistics 
factor for the Germans was the transportation system in the occupied 
part of the Soviet Union and its ability to support continued movement 
of the German field armies toward Moscow. The premier problem, 
which the Germans had planned for and were well aware of, was the 
reconstruction and maintenance of a heavily-damaged Soviet rail sys-
tem to conform with the narrower German standard-gauge track. The 
other problem was the development and maintenance of a primitive 
road system through difficult terrain comprising deep sand, dense for-
ests, and extensive tracts of marshland. 
Elements of Panzer Groups II and III arrived on July 15, 1941 in 
and around Smolensk, 700 kilometers into the Soviet Union from the 
1939 border, but the commanders did not note significant logistics 
problems until two weeks later. At that time, the commanders men-
tioned shortages with the resupply of artillery ammunition, but corre-
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lated them with the special conditions of positional warfare which had 
developed around Smolensk and Yelnya as the Germans paused to re-
duce the Smolensk cauldrons. The Germans required until approxi-
mately July 27, 1941 to bring the Smolensk battles to a close with the 
elimination of the encircled Soviet forces. On that date, the question 
may be asked fairly: After thirty-six days of almost-continuous march-
ing or combat, were the Germans able to continue the move toward 
Moscow? From the viewpoint of morale and logistics, German state-
ments from late July 1941 support a view that the divisions of Army 
Group Center could have attacked toward Moscow by approximately 
August 4, 1941.9 The strongest evidence in support of a timely capabili-
ty to move toward Moscow is found in the German attack at Roslavl. 
With the end of the Smolensk battle late in July 1941, and notwith-
standing Hitler's vacillation on the choice of tactics to continue the 
war, Headquarters, Army Group Center prepared for an attack against 
Moscow. Convinced that Hitler would give the green light for the final 
attack toward Moscow, Army Group Center in fact began the battle by 
reinforcing the newly-designated Armeegruppe Guderian and launching 
an attack involving five army corps. In the ensuing battle at Roslavl 
from August 1 to 8, 1941, Guderian's reinforced Armeegruppe fought a 
9 Panzer A.0.K.2, Anlagenband Nr. 40 zum K.T.B.Nr.l, von 22.6.1944 bis 
31.2.1942, Bundesarchiv, Freiburg, RH 21-2/v. 171, contains the "personnel 
and materiel standings" for two armored corps of Panzer Gruppe 2 at the end 
of the Smolensk battle, i.e., the beginning of the originally-projected drive for 
Moscow. The estimates are those of the responsible commanders who would 
execute further offensive movement. 
The commanding general of the XXJV Pz.K., Freiherr von Geyr, summed up 
on July 26, 1941, the readiness of his corps for the anticipated drive to Mos-
cow as follows: "I consider as necessary a pause for rest of about eight days 
for assuring the replacement of personnel and equipment and to make the di-
visions ready for further missions of all kinds." Geyr was saying essentially that 
his armored corps would be ready to resume the drive to the east by August 4, 
1941, i.e., a month prior to the time it began its drive to the south. His corps 
comprised two Panzer and one motorized infantry divisions. 
In the neighboring XXXXVII Pz.K., the commanding generals of the Panzer 
and motorized infantry divisions expressed the readiness of their organizations 
for combat as follows: 
I. 18.Pz.D (July 28, 1941). "With the existing fighting troops and with due 
regard for the materiel situation of the tanks and trucks, the division can be 
signified as ready for a further 100-200 km. of movement in combat." 
2. 17.Pz.D. (July 28, 1941). "The division is ready [bereit] for insertion in 
further combat." 
3. 29.1.D. (mot.) (July 28, 1941). "The division is qualified for [fahig] inser-
tion in further combat." 
The estimates noted above include specific consideration of matters of mo-
rale, physical rest for the troops, fuel and ammunition resupply, casualty re-
placements, and vehicle maintenance. 
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tactical masterpiece which gave the Germans control over communica-
tions in the southern half of the sector of Army Group Center for a 
timely (i.e., approximately August 18, 1941) advance against Moscow. 
Both Guderian and Hermann Geyer, Commander of IX. Armeekorps, 
engaged in the battle and commented on the high morale of the troops; 
Guderian paints a vivid picture in his memoirs of a highly-charged 
psychological atmosphere comprising anticipation on the part of the 
German troops that they were on the threshold of the final attack 
toward Moscow. 10 
The attack at Roslavl was a strong victory, even by the standards of 
the eastern front. The Germans took 38,000 prisoners and captured 250 
tanks in the clash, and near the end of the struggle on August 7, 1941, 
German reconnaissance units reported no Soviet forces for twenty-five 
miles to the southeast of Roslavl toward Bryansk. The battle supports 
a view that Army Group Center had the logistics capability and com-
bat strength in the first half of August 1941 to have advanced on Mos-
cow against Soviet forces capable of being mastered by the German 
field armies. Several days earlier, on August 4, 1941, the independently-
minded commander of the largest German tank group in the Soviet 
Union had already directed his staff to prepare for an advance on 
Moscow "with point of main effort through Roslavl toward Viasma. " 11 
The Roslavl battle, the planning by the commander of Panzer Gruppe 
II for the resumption of the advance on Moscow, and his attitude that 
success of the offensive was axiomatic, together form a prima facie case 
in support of a German capability to move successfully against Mos-
cow in mid-August 1941. 
The attitude of the civilian populace toward the invading Germans 
was also a significant factor in the campaign. The consensus in histori-
cal writing, indeed, is that a more enlightened German occupation 
policy-stressing cooperation among the German people and the var-
ious ethnic groups in Soviet Russia, reestablishment and encouragement 
of individual peasant landholding, and destruction of the Communist 
bureaucracy, etc.-could have swung the war in favor of the Germans. 
During the initial onslaught, the Germans were greeted as liberators by 
the Baltic peoples and favorably received in many areas in the Ukraine. 
Even in White Russia and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Re-
10 Hermann Geyer, Das IX. Armeekorps im Ostfeldzug 1941 (Neckargemlind, 
1969), pp. 67, 68, 70, 75, 77, comments on the high state of German morale 
during the period June 22-July 25, 1941, the solvency of the logistics situation, 
and the necessity for the Germans to strike singlemindedly toward Moscow. He 
specifically notes that his three infantry divisions lived off the land "50 to 100 
percent" as concerns rations, and used almost exclusively captured stocks of 
Soviet fuel for the motor vehicles of the divisions. 
11 Guderian, Panzer Leader, 192-194. 
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public, many Russian communities greeted the advancing Germans as 
potential friends and liberators during the first three months of Barba-
rossa. It took the civilian National Socialist Reich Kommissars follow-
ing the field armies several months to alienate the Ukrainian and Rus-
sian populace. A German offensive toward Moscow in mid-August 
1941 would have been increased in effectiveness by the lingering friend-
liness and quiescence of the Russian population on the central front. 
The success of the Blitz phase of the campaign in the east has not 
been awarded an accurate appreciation largely because of the way in 
which the Barbarossa Plan has become clouded by the years of war 
which followed its opening stage. It can be said with restraint, and 
supported in detail, that the Soviets required four years and massive 
assistance from the governments of the United States, Great Britain, 
and the British Commonwealth states overseas, to recover from the 
first four weeks of the war. Accurate OKH casualty figures for the 
German armies in the east show losses from June 22 to July 16, 1941, 
in killed, wounded, and missing at 102,588 men, substantially fewer 
than for the campaign in the west for a similar operational time of ap-
proximately four weeks. 12 One cannot state Soviet losses during the 
opening stages of Barbarossa with similar certainty, but they can be 
considered as approximately 1,169,000 in killed, wounded, and cap-
tured, predominantly on the central front before Moscow. 13 In the 
middle of July 1941, the German armies stood intact with one-third 
12 See Halder, Kriegstagebuch, vol. 2, p. 95. 
13 The Soviet figure is based on the following synthesis: (I) for prisoners, 
German claims of Soviet prisoners taken in the frontier battles in the center at 
Bialystok-Minsk (324,000) and Smolensk (310,000), and in the north (35,000), 
and the south (150,000); and (2) for killed and wounded, Soviet losses present-
ed in Soobshcheniia, 1941, 1:375, reevaluated and compared with German 
losses for the same period. The assumptions have been made for Soviet killed 
and wounded that the admitted Soviet losses are reasonably accurate but low. 
The further assumption has been made that the Soviet losses are greater than 
the accurate German figures for Germans killed and wounded. Soviet casual-
ties are assumed to be greater than the figure of 102,588 for Germans killed, 
wounded, and missing, and probably are greater than the Soviet figure of ap-
proximately 288,000 extrapolated directly from the Soviet admission of 1,602,000 
killed, wounded, and missing for the period June 22-Nov. 26, 1941. Using a 
larger total of 350,000 Soviet"l-.'lled and wounded based on the high intensity -of 
the frontier battles and the probability of low Soviet estimates, the following 
balance of casualties can be made for the period of combat extending from 
June 22 to July 20, 1941: 
Soviet Losses 














fewer casualties than were suffered by German forces in France during 
a similar period of combat. The OKH looked forward to two to three 
weeks of physical rest and mechanical rehabilitation for the eastern 
armies and then to concentration of the recuperated capabilities of the 
armies on the seizure of Moscow. 
Hitler vacillated in the middle of July 1941, with victory in the east 
comfortably at his fingertips, and then made the most significant deci-
sion of the Second World War in Europe-to deflect elements of Army 
Group Center into the Ukraine. 14 The resulting thrust by the reinforced 
Second Panzer Group and Second Army won the Germans their most 
substantial victory in the entire eastern campaign but was heavily ex-
hausting. The great oblique maneuver entailed the deflection of half the 
combat elements of Army Group Center 300 miles south into the 
Ukraine. For the final strike at Moscow later in the year, the same 
German forces had to be redeployed an average of about 200 miles to 
the north. The superiority of the German armies, which was demon-
strated conclusively in the frontier battles and the great Kiev cauldron, 
supports several generalizations. First, the motorized elements of the 
German armies had the mobility and striking power to have taken 
Moscow if seizure of the city had been the main effort of the Germans, 
instead of the drive east of Kiev. Time was a crucial factor and had 
Hitler, for example, assigned the armies in the east the task of attack-
ing Moscow on approximately August 7, 1941, it seems probable, in 
the absence of prepared positions and constituted reserves, and in the 
presence of weather favorable to the Germans, that Moscow would 
have fallen by approximately August 28, 1941. Second, the factor of 
space figured in, as the German field armies showed their tactical su-
periority to maximum advantage in the vast space and gentle terrain of 
the Central Ukraine; the defending Soviet armies could neither move 
fast enough to escape nor stand and fight the Germans effectively 
enough to defeat them in the summer of 1941. 15 
14 See the perceptive and similarly-styled accounts in Downing, Devil's Vir-
tuosos, pp. 70-79, and Clark, Barbarossa, 98-113, and the solid comments in 
Blau, German Campaign in Russia, pp. 69, 70, 89 (para. C). First-hand accounts 
of Hitler's dispersal of German strengths in August 1941 include especially 
Halder, Kriegstagebuch, vol. 3, pp. 175-177, 192-195; Guderian, Panzer Leader, 
pp. 189-202; and U.S. Army, European Command, Historical Division, Gener-
al der Infanterie Hans von Greiffenberg et al., Die Schlacht von Moskau, Heeres-
gruppe Mitte, Winter 1941/42 (n.d.), pp. 8-38. 
15 See in Manstein, Lost Victories, pp. 217-220, where the German I Ith 
Army, with neither tanks nor tactical air support, is constrained by the acci-
dents of geography to assault Soviet troops superior in number defending the 
narrow Isthmus of Ishun-the gate to the Crimea. In spite of Soviet strategical 
concern in retaining the Crimea, Manstein's divisions broke through the de-
fending Soviets and proceeded to the siege of Sevastopol. The contrasting situ-
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TABLE 1 
OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED BY THE SECOND p ANZER GROUP 
JUNE TO DECEMBER, 1941 
TIME ROUTE OR AREA DIRECTION DISTANCE 
June 22-July 16 (25 days) Brest to Smolensk east 400 miles 
July 17-August 24 
(39 days) Yelnya (static) 0 miles 
August 25-September 22 
(29 days) Roslavl to Lochvitz south 300 miles 
September 23-0ctober 1 
(9 days) Lochvitz to Yanopol north 200 miles 
October 2-December 5 
(35 days) Yanopol to Skopin east 300 miles 
The German armies consolidating the Moscow area would have been 
carried well to the east of the city, 16 and with the advantage of the rail 
communications radiating from the Russian capital, could have carried 
out operations against the dangling and isolated flanks of the physical-
ly disconnected Soviet armies defending the northern area associated 
with Leningrad, Murmansk, and Archangel, and the southern area of 
Kharkov, Voronezh, and Rostov. The consolidation of the Moscow 
area is plausible, as borne out by the combat mobility of the Second 
Panzer Group, Army Group Center. Genera/oberst Heinz Guderian's 
Panzer, motorized, and hard-marching infantry divisions achieved the 
objectives delineated in Table 1 on a remarkably close timetable. 
The Second Panzer Group moved approximately 1200 miles through 
the Soviet Union in spite of the extraordinary self-enforced halt of 
thirty-nine days around Smolensk and Yelnya. Analyzed in slightly dif-
ferent fashion, Guderian's achievement (after having attained the Yel-
nya area in twenty-five days of movement and combat) consisted of 
continuing more than 800 miles farther through the Soviet Union. The 
distances listed are direct line values; the actual road travel is con-
ation in which adequate space and open terrain favored mobile operation and 
the Soviets were literally unable to keep up with the Germans is shown in Sep-
tember in the Ukraine in the great Kiev cauldron. See Munzel, Panzer Taktik, 
pp. 96-101; Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 202-226, and Clark, Barbarossa, pp. 
132-139. 
16 Although the statement is conjectural, units of the twenty-ninth Motorized 
Infantry Division, Second Panzer Army, Army Group Center, actually stood 
beyond Skopin, approximately ninety miles east of Moscow late in November 
1941. See Greiffenberg, Sch/acht von Moskau, Anlage B, p. 216, where recon-
naissance toward Skopin is mentioned and Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 255, in 
which Skopin is specifically noted as being evacuated on November 29, 1941. 
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siderably greater. For a grasp of the offensive capabilities of the Ger-
man army in 1941, it is important to note that for 600 miles the offen-
sive was conducted against armed resistance. It is instructive to note-
in the sense of the human achievement involved-that the German 
infantry divisions of the accompanying infantry armies, never far be-
hind the Second Panzer Group, covered much of the distance marching 
on foot. A potential conclusion based on the fact of 600 miles of 
movement against resistance is the following: had Guderian's Second 
Panzer Army moved directly east from Y elnya the distance it proved 
capable of moving in its tortuous gyration toward Moscow from the 
southwest, it would have attained the area centered in Gorki, 300 miles 
east of Moscow. This conjecture casts new light on the balance of mil-
itary strength between Germany and Russia in 1941. Historians have 
come generally to consider Hitler's optimism about a swift conclusion 
to the Russian campaign as being tinged with the Fiihrer's special 
brand of hyperbolism, but the optimism was securely buttressed by the 
actual achievements of the Second Panzer Group. 
Few historical factors in modern military studies have been more 
abused than that of Russian space. The latter item has been assigned 
high priority among the general factors which contributed to the defeat 
of the Swedes (1709), French (1812), and Germans (ultimately in 1945). 
Historians and cqmmentators have persistently linked Russian space 
with other natural factors summarized under the heading of "Generals 
Winter and Mud" (i.e., Russian winters, spring thaws, and autumn 
rains) and also with the human virtues associated with patriotism in 
the defense of the motherland.17 An historical cliche has emerged in 
generalizing about the causes of the German defeat which can be rep-
resented under the heading of "trading space for time." The implica-
tion of the cliche for the Second World War is that the Red Army with 
malice and forethought lured the German army deep into Russia. Hav-
ing carefully husbanded its own strength, the Red Army was then sup-
posed to have launched a powerful counterthrust supported by weather 
favorable for the less polished Soviet mode of fighting, based on re-
serves massed for the occasion and drawn from the huge reservoir of 
Russian manpower. 
But enticing as the thesis of trading space for time may appear on 
the surface, it fails to correspond with the realities of the year 1941. 
"Just before the war broke out," for example, the Soviets transferred 
17 For the basics from the German side, see Erhard Raus, Effects of Climate 
on Combat in European Russia, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-291 
(Washington D.C., 1952). The principal author is a German army officer who 
commanded in succession a Panzer division, Panzer army, and army group on 
the eastern front from 1941 to 1945. 
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five armies into those "frontier districts" determined to resist strongly 
as far to the west as possible. 18 The essence of German military success 
in the Second World War, furthermore, lay in the excellence of the 
German army in terms of the mobility of its striking forces and the 
flexible operational methods of the commanders and staffs. Possibly the 
most challenging problem which the German army faced in its attack 
in western Europe, for example, was the lack of space in which to exert 
its superior mobility. 19 On the one hand, German Panzer and motor-
ized equipment were geared for swift movement; indeed, the major 
weakness of the German armored force until late 1942 was the ex-
traordinary debility of its tanks in terms of armored protection and 
gun power. 20 On the other hand, German superiority in coordination 
of arms, flexibility in the formation of ad hoc battle groups, and swift-
ness of command reaction to the fluid conditions of modern battle gave 
the German army decisive advantages over the Red Army in warfare of 
maneuver. 
The most popular view of the German defeat in Russia is the one in 
which Hitler, the OKH, and the German field commanders are present-
ed as underrating the Soviet military strength and being caught by the 
legendary Russian winter short of Moscow. However, the part of the 
view in which Hitler and the German military leaders underestimated 
the Soviet Russian military challenge is open to criticism from several 
18 S. M. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War 1941-1945 (Moscow, 
1970), p. 30. 
19 The Germans were faced with the following strategical quandary in the 
planning for the attack against France: where in the limited space and difficult 
terrain of the geographical region from the Swiss border to the English Chan-
nel could a successful advance be realized? Two basics of geography-space 
and terrain-favored the potential defenders. The author of the German plan 
used in the attack exhibited consummate virtuosity in grand tactics and strat-
egy by uncovering an area in which a decisive attack by mobile forces could 
take place. 
Adverse geographical factors limited the mobility of the German army in 
almost all of Europe (e.g., Norway, France, the Lowlands, the Balkans, etc.). 
Only in the Soviet Union was enough space available for the German army to 
outmaneuver, encircle, and disintegrate its powerfully equipped, but ponderous-
ly inefficient opponent. 
20 "Gun power" is admittedly an emotive, vague term, but refers to the fact 
that until late 1942, the Germans continued to have inferior light vehicles like 
the German 9.9-ton Panzer II and Czech TNHP-38 tanks in significant numbers 
in combat. They also continued to arm the heavier German Panzer III and IV 
vehicles with the feeble 50mm. KwK L/42 and 75mm. KwK L/24 weapons. 
For the tank situation in the Battle of France, see the detailed account in 
R. H. S. Stolfi, "Equipment for Victory in France, 1940," History (Oxford), 56 
(January, 1970): 1-20, in which the high technical qualities, superior numbers, 
and advanced organization of the French tank force are presented. 
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directions. Commentators on Barbarossa consistently point to the 
German eight-to-ten-week timetable for victory as evidence that the 
Germans underestimated the Red Army, basing their contention signif-
icantly on the fact that the war dragged on for almost four years. Yet 
commentators on the earlier Schlieffen plan, which as a grand strategic 
plan for the opening attack of a war is similar to Barbarossa, do not 
point out the German anticipation of victory in six weeks as evidence 
of a similar underestimation of the French army, even though the First 
World War lasted for more than four years. In the case of the 
Schlieffen Plan, historians have effectively analyzed factors such as the 
weakening of the German right flank in the initial deployment of at-
tacking forces, the lack of aggressive, forward leadership by the 
younger Moltke, etc. as crucial in the miscarriage of an operation 
which, nevertheless, came close to achieving a quick victory for the 
Germans in the west. In stark contrast, writers commenting on Barba-
rossa commonly emphasize the questionable point that once the Ger-
mans attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, there lay before them only a 
rocky and downhill path to certain defeat. 21 Examination of the details 
21 The more prestigious works on the Russo-German campaign by American 
and British authors, and hence those readily available in English describe both 
Hitler and the German army as underestimating the powers of resistance of the 
Red Army and thereby foredooming themselves to certain defeat. The view is 
unhistorical, i.e., unrealistic, based significantly as it is on the assumptions that 
(1) the historical act was predetermined in its outcome, and (2) the tendency of 
the view to base itself on the known result that the Germans, albeit in 1945, in 
fact, lost the war, rather than on the merits of the actual historical situation in 
the period July 1940-December 1941. See, for example, Blau, German Cam-
paign in Russia, pp. 88, 89, and Clark, Barbarossa, pp. 41-43. Steiger, Panzer-
taktik in Kriegstagebuchern, pp. 24-26, 28, 29, is a recent, well-documented 
German work which emphasizes German underestimation of Russia and the 
Red Army. Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (New York, 1962), pp. 
333-339, in refreshing contrast, even though it is a general account and depen-
dent upon the more detailed specific works, only partly supports the common 
view of German underestimation of the difficulties of a campaign in the east. 
Walter Kerr, in The Secret of Stalingrad (Garden City, N.Y., 1978), p. 23, a 
recent work, presents a caricature of German underestimation of ihe Russians 
in 1941 which detracts from an otherwise valuable contribution to the under-
standing of Soviet success at Stalingrad in late 1942. German military writings 
on the subject are consistent in the position taken or implied that Moscow 
could have been seized before the autumn rains and the seizure accompanied 
by a decisive defeat of the Red Army and the Soviet government. Soviet writ-
ings exist which are consistent in their broad implication that the Germans had 
the clear opportunity and requisite strength in the summer of 1941 to have de-
feated the Soviet Union. See, for example, S. M. Shtemenko, The Soviet Gener-
al Staff at War, 1941-1945 (Moscow, 1970), pp. 26, 30, 31, 32-36, 38, 40. For 
the magnitude of the summer disaster as reported by the Soviets, see Soob-
shcheniia Sovetskogo lnformbiuro, V.I. iun'-dekabr' 1941 goda. (Sovinformbi-
uro, Moskva, 1944), pp. 374, 375, in which the Soviet Information Bureau 
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of the German attack in 1941-in the more effective manner of the 
commentators on the Schlieffen Plan-shows that the Germans in fact 
came close to achieving a quick victory in the east. 22 
The widely-held view that Hitler greatly underestimated the military 
capabilities of the Soviets must be accepted with caution, because his 
armies stood poised with victory at their fingertips in Smolensk on July 
16, 1941, and in Khimki, a northwest suburb of Moscow, in late No-
vember 1941. The astounding victories of the Germans from June to 
November 1941 do not fit comfortably within the picture of Hitler's 
underestimating Soviet military strength. The answer to the quandary 
is probably found in the seldom-made analysis that Hitler also underes-
timated the offensive strength of the attacking German armored force. 
Such an analysis is supported by his comments and actions within the 
Polish, western, and North African campaigns and the first several 
months of the war against Russia, although it is also contradicted by 
Hitler's assignment of unrealistic objectives to the central and southern 
armies in late autumn 1941. 23 The part of the general view of the Ger-
presents exaggerated losses for the Germans in the period June 22-November 
26, 1941, contrasting them somewhat naively with substantially lower Soviet 
losses. The Soviets admit the loss in the five-month period of 2,122,000 men, 
7,900 tanks, 6,400 aircraft, and 12,900 guns, disastrous figures even for the ex-
pansive standards of the eastern front. 
22 Unlike the situation in 1812 where the relatively small and lightly-armed 
Russian armies avoided battle with the French and retreated beyond Moscow, 
"a modern force of 100 divisions could not simply abandon its sources of sup-
ply." See Blau, German Campaign in Russia, p. 7, in which Genera/major Erich 
Marcks makes the point in his August 5, 1940 plan of attack on the Soviet 
Union that times had changed since 1812, and the Soviet high command would 
be forced to commit itself decisively to the defense of the industrial and com-
munications center of the state. See also Carell, Hitler Moves East, p. 172, in 
which the author presents the following statement as being made in July 1941 
by Stalin to Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's personal representative and Kremlin 
visitor: "If Moscow falls, the Red Army will have to give up the whole of Rus-
sia west of the Volga." For the plainly desperate nature of the Soviet position, 
see U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, Translations on USSR Military Af-
fairs No. 1364 (Springfield, Virginia, July 18, 1978), p. 61, where Marshal 
Alexander Vasilevskiy notes the following question in October 1941 by Stalin 
to General Gregory Zhukov: "Are you sure that we will hold Moscow? I'm 
asking you this with an aching heart. Tell me honestly, as a Communist." 
23 See Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 92, 109, 110, 117, 130, 183, 190, in which, 
on the last page cited, Hitler comments to the author: "If I had known that the 
figures for Russian tank strength [10,000] which you gave in your book [of 
1937] were ... the true ones, I would not-I believe-ever have started this 
war." The comment by Hitler is one of the most decisive in establishing by 
direct admission his underestimation of the Red Army. In the other cited 
pages, Hitler displays a counterbalancing underestimate of the strategical capa-
bilities of the German armored force. The combined effect of the two mis-
judgments was for each to cancel the other, i.e., as Barbarossa unfolded, the 
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man defeat in the east, finally, which presents the Germans as being 
caught by the legendary Russian winter short of Moscow, contains the 
implication that the Germans drove in one continuous effort toward 
the capital. The view as such is misleading and can be accepted only 
with the caveat that the collapse at Moscow was part of a discontinu-
ous attack on the part of the Germans which included eleven weeks 
of procrastination and misdirection of effort by Hitler away from 
Moscow. 
The German armies in the east-with the plan, the military leader-
ship, the arms, and the men to defeat the Soviet Union-were mis-
handled by the supreme command in terms of halts, alarms, and ex-
traneous excursions. The mishandling was practically identical with 
that exhibited by Hitler from May to June 1940, during the campaign 
in the west but muted by the circumstance of victory. In the western 
case, having exhibited the strategical perception to embrace the cam-
paign plan of Genera/major Erich von Manstein, Chief of Staff, Army 
Group A, Hitler intervened heavily in the military details of the cam-
paign. It has become widely known that Hitler ordered the German 
units which had broken through to the sea south of Dunkirk to halt, 
thus contributing decisively to the British success in extracting the part 
of the British Expeditionary Force which remained in Belgium. It has re-
mained less well known that Hitler, earlier in the campaign on May 17, 
1940, ordered a halt which had far greater potential consequences for 
the campaign. 24 On the earlier date, he halted the Panzer columns of 
the XIX Panzer Corps of General der Panzertruppen Heinz Guderian in 
the vicinity of Marie and Dercy, far from the English Channel. 25 The 
underestimated German armored force operated on schedule with devastating 
effect against the underestimated Red Army. 
24 Hitler and the commander and staff of Army Group A grew increasingly 
concerned in the period May 15-17, 1940 about the threat to the southern 
flank of the great penetration which developed out of the Sedan bridgehead 
toward the channel coast. In contrast, the Commander and the Chief of Staff 
of the German army considered that the French would prove unable to mount 
an attack from the south. Hitler, in particular, lost his nerve at this point in 
the campaign, i.e., roughly May 15-19, 1940, but lost the battle of wills with 
the Chief of Staff, General der Artillerie Franz Halder, in OKH, and General 
der Panzertruppen Heinz Guderian close to the front at Soize. The details of the 
situation are discussed from a variety of directions in Taylor, March of Con-
quest, pp. 228-233; Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 109-112; Ulrich Liss, West-
front 1939140, Erinnerungen der Feind bearbeiters im OKH (NeckargemUnd, 
1959), pp. 165-175; Halder, Kriegstagebuch, vol. 1, pp. 299-322, and Warli-
mont, Hitler's Headquarters, pp. 94-99. 
25 Guderian had been halted previously by the nervousness of Headquarters, 
Panzergruppe Kleist, and Army Group A on the evening of May 15, 1941. With 
immense will power, he personally contacted General der Kavallerie Ewald von 
Kleist, and after a nasty telephone scene in which he reminded Kleist of the 
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halt gave the opportunity to the slowly-reacting Allied armies in the 
Lowlands to recover from the breakthrough at Sedan, stabilize the 
front, and block the units of German Army Group A from reaching 
the English Channel. 
The psychological framework within which Hitler was operating at 
this time remains unclear. He ordered his field armies to halt on two 
occasions, however, providing support for a view that he did not feel 
that the armies could successfully continue their attack through to 
Dunkirk in the one case and the English Channel in the other. The ev-
idence of his two momentous orders to halt suggests that generically 
Hitler underestimated the capabilities of the armies which (1) it is con-
ceded by historians probably would have taken Dunkirk before the 
British arrived there in strength, and (2) armies which, it is historically 
verifiable, possessed the strength to break through to the Channel. 26 
In the opening stages of the campaign in the east in 1941, Hitler dem-
onstrated a similar pattern of indecision. He enforced a halt in the ad-
vance of Army Group Center for a period of thirty-nine irretrievable 
days of favorable campaigning weather, thereby also allowing time for 
deepening of the disintegrating shock resulting from the literal annihi-
lation of the Soviet armies west of the Dnieper River on the central 
front, which was evidenced by the unstructured, desperate attempts of 
the Soviets to set up adequate defenses between Smolensk and Mos-
cow. 27 In September in the north, Hitler made another famed seaport 
decision. He ordered Army Group North under Generalfeldmarschall 
Ritter van Leeb, which had broken into the outskirts of Leningrad, to 
halt outside the city and to effect what geographical circumstance 
would dictate to be an incomplete encirclement of that important in-
dustrial area. 28 
1914 Hentzsch Mission and resulting "Miracle of the Marne," temporarily re-
gained freedom of movement. See Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 107. 
26 See George H. Stein, The Wajfen SS, Hitler's Elite Guard at War 1939-1945 
(Ithaca, N.Y. and London, 1966), p. 71, and Charles Sydnor, Soldiers of De-
struction (Princeton, 1977), pp. 97-99, in which Wajfen SS units breach the Al-
lies' canal positions screening Dunkirk on May 24, 1940, disregarding the di-
rective to halt. 
27 See in Shtemenko, Soviet General Staff, pp. 34-38, in the few pages allot-
ted to the disasters of June-July 1941, the fact that both the general staff and 
the front commanders faced major problems of locating, let alone controlling, 
their troops. Shtemenko states, for example, that "it was not our fault but our 
misfortune that we did not always have sufficiently detailed information about 
the disposition of our troops" and "there were other complications. One day it 
became known that for losing control of [his] troops D. G. Pavlov, Command-
er of the Western Front, ... had been removed from [his] post." 
28 See the first-hand account in Kurt von Zydowitz, Die Geschichte der 58. 
lnfanterie-Division, 1939-1945 (Kiel, 1952), pp. 37-39. Oberleutnants MUiler and 
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The historical point is that in the French case, Hitler shook off the 
doubts and paralysis of May 17-19, 1940, in time to allow the soldiers 
to continue the attack successfully. In the Russian case, Hitler stretched 
out the delay in resumption of the advance from the forty-eight hours 
of the French case to thirty-nine days. In the face of professional mil-
itary rejection of his view that the wings should be the objectives of the 
campaign, and to the suspicious astonishment of the Soviet govern-
ment, Hitler ordered the attack of Army Group Center into the 
Ukraine.29 The advance against Moscow did not resume until October 2, 
1941, delayed by procrastination and secondary targets for the extrava-
gantly long time of seventy-eight days from the seizure of Smolensk. 
The result was that the Soviet government was presented with the same 
seventy-eight days to recover from the first four weeks of the cam-
paign. To place the Russian predicament within the framework of the 
analogous French situation, one might ask the question: How would 
the French campaign have turned out if the German high command 
had halted the XIX Panzer Corps of General der Panzertruppen Guder-
ian at Marie and Dercy in northern France for thirty-nine days while 
Hitler procrastinated about the next move for the armies and then 
made the decision to clean up the situation on the wings of the ad-
vance, thus not resuming the drive to the Channel for seventy-eight 
days? The analogy is suggested as a reasonable one to bring into focus 
more clearly than heretofore the extraordinary delays and obliquities in 
the German campaign in Soviet Russia in 1941. 
Because of Hitler's procrastination in ordering the move southward, 
and the time involved in bringing the southern movement to a success-
Schwenson of II./I.R. 209 (Second Battalion, 209th Infantry Regiment) and 
elements of the battalion seized the Uritzk rail station on the evening of Sep-
tember 15, 1941, and stood in the midst of a disintegrating adversary. The au-
thor writes: "the enemy was surprised and confused. It remains incomprehensi-
ble that this position was not exploited further." 
29 See in Warlimont, Hitler's Headquarters, pp. 181-193, the view inside 
OKW of the struggle for a decisive course of action in the Soviet Union after 
July 16, 1941. Warlimont makes it clear that the OKH responded consistently 
in favor of the "central strategy around which the whole eastern campaign had 
been planned," i.e., the seizure of Moscow. Halder makes it abundantly clear 
in his contemporary Kriegstagebuch and Guderian in his postwar memoirs that 
Moscow should have been the central objective of the German field armies. 
Suspicious resentment of such views exists in the western historical profession 
based on the alleged tendency of the German generals of the Second World 
War to make Hitler the scapegoat for German military defeat. In the case of 
the July-August 1941 crisis over the focus for operations in Soviet Russia, 
however, evidence is overwhelming that "Hitler overrode all his advisors-
except Keitel" and imposed a dispersion of forces into the Ukraine. See Blau, 
German Campaign, pp. 59-70. 
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ful conclusion, the German armies began to face overriding problems 
of weather satisfactory for the continuation of offensive operations. 
The Germans did not open Operation Typhoon, the offensive against 
Moscow, until October 2, 1941, well into the Russian autumn. 30 Added 
to the problem of the deteriorating weather, Army Group Center had 
to contend with the exhaustion of its southern wing after the advance 
into the Ukraine. Because of the Ukrainian interlude, the question of 
German victory at Moscow in 1941 began to develop into a most close-
ly run thing. German mobility and offensive momentum were signifi-
cantly dependent upon basic geographic factors like the rains of Oc-
tober, which could severely inhibit motorized movement along the 
primitive Soviet road network. 31 The questions of autumn rain and the 
onset of winter in late 1941 began to assume critical importance. 
By October 9, 1941-within a week after the opening of the autumn 
offensive against Moscow-the German field armies had achieved a 
grand tactical victory on the scale of the Kiev battle. The Germans en-
circled two massive Soviet forces, one near Viasma and the other near 
Bryansk, neither of which was capable of breaking free. By October 17, 
1941, Army Group Center had cleared the great pockets of Soviet 
troops, capturing approximately 660,000 prisoners from among the 
roughly 1,500,000 Soviet troops massed during the great seventy-eight-
day hiatus in German activity on the central front. Panic broke out 
among the civilians in Moscow, and the Soviet authorities found it dif-
ficult to allay popular fears, because they themselves were forced to 
begin the evacuation of the national government. The German field 
armies seemed destined to seize Moscow and force the Soviets east of 
the Volga River and out of the war. The German eastern armies, in 
spite of strong and varied challenges, which had included the epic pro-
crastination of Hitler, the introduction of the Soviet T-34 tank, the 
ruthless expenditure of Russian riflemen by the Soviet leadership, and 
the oblique excursion of Army Group Center into the Ukraine, had de-
30 Hoth, Panzer Operationen, p. 136, notes that the first snow on the central 
front fell on October 7, 1941, "the day the ring around Viasma was closed." 
Buercky (p. 15) comments on the first fall of snow four days later in the 
Ukraine near Romny on October 11, 1941 (Genera/major Heinrich Buercky, 
"Advance in Action of an Infantry Regiment from 22 June 1941-January 1942; 
Recollections and Experiences" [n.d.]. U. S. Army, European Command, His-
tory Division, MS no. D-140). 
31 See, for example, Erhard Raus, Effects of Climate on Combat in European 
Russia, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-291 (Washington, D.C., 
1942), pp. 30, 33-34; Munzel, Panzer Taktik, pp. 105-108; Wagener, Moskau, 
pp. 79-105; Carell, Hitler Moves East, 156-162; and Walter Chales de Beaulieu, 
Generaloberst Erich Hoepner (NeckargemUnd, pp. 195-213), for the adverse im-
pact of the autumn rains on German offensive operations. 
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feated the Soviet forces defending Moscow. They had only a short dis-
tance to advance to complete the disintegration of the Soviet army and 
occupy the communications center of European Russia. 
By mid-October, however, rains in conjunction with cooler autumn 
temperatures, shorter overcast days, and reduced evaporation had be-
come common and turned the unpaved roads of Russia and the sur-
rounding countryside into impassable barriers for wheeled vehicles. The 
Germans successfully reduced the Viasma and Bryansk pockets, but 
their progress toward Moscow was stalled by the disintegration of the 
Soviet road system. Offered yet a third opportunity for survival, the 
Soviet government built up a new defensive front which included Mos-
cow itself in late October and early November 1941. Historical overgen-
eralization runs rampant at this juncture, with the weight of interpreta-
tion agreeing that Russian space had exhausted the Germans, who had 
run out of time by November 1941 in their efforts to seize Moscow. 
Under reappraisal, however, Russian space must be noted as a mixed 
blessing for the Soviets and a factor which largely favored the Ger-
mans. One must also note in reappraisal that the Germans ran out of 
time near Moscow not through necessity but by choice. Months before 
the November crisis, the army leaders had demanded and the front 
soldiers had expected a drive on Moscow. Hitler, for reasons which 
remain only partly comprehensible, determined instead to seize the re-
sources of the Ukraine and by that aberrant stroke throw the Moscow 
battle to the mercy of climatological chance in the late autumn of 1941. 
